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Abstract
Speech given at Session 1: The Global Capital Market: What’s Next. Michael Patterson
spoke on aspects of the global financial markets that are common to Japan and the United States
including the converging roles of traditionally distinct kinds of institutions participating in such
markets; the impact of that convergence on legal and regulatory structures, particularly in the
United States; and finally, the challenges of such global convergence for the supervision of global
financial institutions.
CONVERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SERVICES
Michael E. Patterson*
Thank you all for including me in this distinguished group.
Despite the differences between Japan and the United
States, I'd like to focus my remarks this morning on three as-
pects of the global financial markets that I think are common to
both Japan and the United States, and, indeed, across the globe:
first, the converging roles of traditionally distinct kinds of institu-
tions participating in such markets; second, the impact of that
convergence on legal and regulatory structures, particularly in
the United States; and finally, the challenges of such global con-
vergence for the supervision of global financial institutions.
I won't dwell long on the macroeconomics, except to re-
mind us that the explosive growth in global financial markets is
driven by a variety of well-reported factors: the impact of demo-
graphic changes on world savings, which Paul Volcker men-
tioned;1 trends toward less government control of financial activ-
ities, including liberalization, deregulization and opening of na-
tional markets, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises;
and information technology that has reduced geographic dis-
tances, quickened the pace and reduced the cost of transactions,
and enabled the rapid evolution of new financial products and
techniques. Chief among those techniques is securitization, that
is, the various ways by which financial assets increasingly become
tradeable, directly or indirectly, in liquid markets.
As Paul Volcker reminds us, globalization - and, indeed,
securitization - are not new trends, but I believe they are still in
their relative infancy. It is estimated, just to give you one predic-
tion, that the global market for tradeable financial assets, includ-
ing money, is expanding at about three times the rate of the real
economy, and that by the year 2000 the world's liquid stock will
be three times the then-US$27 trillion nominal GDP of OECD2
* Vice Chairman, J.P. Morgan & Co. Incorporated.
1. See Paul A. Volcker, Perspectives on Global Capital Markets, 21 FoRDmI.t INT'L L.J.
367 (1997).
2. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 179.
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nations.
But what is happening in this environment to the roles of
traditionally distinct financial institutions? I'm referring to com-
mercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and in-
vestment management firms. They are converging and are all
becoming more alike. Not only has securitization eliminated
traditional intermediary functions, such as bank loans to highly
rated corporations, but customer preferences, synergies among
financial products that take different forms but share economic
and risk attributes, and the need to build economies of scale
have driven many of us to broaden the range of products and
services.
So, today, we find that many commercial banks have ex-
panded into the capital markets activities of underwriting and
dealing in securities of all kinds, as well as other traditional in-
vestment banking activities of brokerage, M&A advice, and
merchant banking. J.P. Morgan was perhaps the hardest hit by
the disintermediation of commercial lending to its traditional
wholesale client base, and we have pushed furthest into invest-
ment banking, to the point where we rank in the top five or ten
places in most investment banking league tables, and even have
the number one ranking in some, particularly in Latin America.
The market forced us to make a choice: change our clients or
change our products. So we stuck with the former and changed
the latter.
But, it has been very much a two-way street as investment
banks have entered traditional commercial banking domains, in-
cluding custody, retail credit, and syndicated corporate lending.
Recognizing that syndicated loans are still the largest capital
market, even in the United States, and that to clients these loans
differ little from bonds in economic substance, nearly every ma-
jor investment bank has pushed into this market, especially for
non-investment grade credits. Neither investment banks nor
commercial banks want to hold all these loan assets on their bal-
ance sheets, so increasingly liquid primary and secondary mar-
kets for them have developed that approximate the markets for
debt securities.
New non-bank investors, including third-party funds created
by these banks, increasingly participate in this market. From
1989 to 1995, the share of bank investors in non-investment
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grade loans declined from over ninety percent to less than sev-
enty-five percent, while the share of non-banks, including insur-
ance and finance companies, but most particularly public
funds, grew to exceed twenty-five percent, and it is still increas-
ing rapidly.
The convergence I talked about is also evident in invest-
ment management, with every type of institution - commercial
and investment banks, insurance companies, and fund managers
- competing in every product for every investor, from pension
plans, defined contribution plans, and mutual funds, to annui-
ties, and personal trusts. And, although I won't dwell on it, in-
surance and banking have also come together, especially in Eu-
rope but also increasingly in the United States.
I think the development of derivative products has been, in
at least two ways, one of the most powerful agents in this process
of convergence. First, since derivatives were not historically
identified with any particular type of institution, all financial
players have used them, both as clients and as end users. Sec-
ondly, and more importantly, derivatives enable the disaggrega-
tion and repackaging of financial risks that have always been
common to all types of financial products, albeit in different
forms and dealt with in different kinds of institutions. This has
enabled banks, for example, to replicate products they have not
traditionally offered such as some types of insurance or com-
modity hedging. In short, derivatives have brightened the spot-
light on the artificiality of segregating financial institutions by
traditional products.
I'll move on to my second point, which is how legal and
regulatory frameworks are accommodating, or inhibiting, these
market forces toward convergence. Again, I'll focus on the
United States, not only because it has the largest of those mar-
kets, but also because its legal and regulatory structures signifi-
cantly lag market reality. Now, that's not to say that the, U.S.
regulators themselves are lagging the reality. Quite to the con-
trary, our banking regulators have, by and large, been creatively
progressive within their legal constraints - to wit, the Federal
Reserve's authorization of so-called Section 20 securities affili-
ates of banks (I think there are around forty of these now, and
many of them are owned by foreign banks) and the Comptroller
of the Currency's support for banks' expanded insurance sales
activity.
1997]
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But, as Paul Volcker has vividly pointed out, the U.S. law
itself has hardly changed at all. The explanation lies in a combi-
nation of the opposition of powerful interest groups who have
benefitted from the anti-competitive protection of our frag-
mented financial system; jurisdictional battles among our pleth-
ora of federal and state banking, securities, and insurance regu-
lators; and particularly in the case of Glass-Steagall,' obsolete
and discredited, but persistent, notions of risk, on which I'd like
to spend just a moment.
Defenders of Glass-Steagall have argued that its purpose -
or at least its continuing justification - was to shield banks and
the government safety net from the greater risk of financial loss
said to inhere in securities activities than in commercial banking.
This myth persists in too many quarters today, notwithstanding
the uncontroverted evidence that losses from securities activities
had almost nothing to do with the bank failures in the 1930s and
that far fewer securities firms have failed from securities under-
writing and dealing than the thousands of banks that have been
brought down by bad loans. Indeed, it is self-evident that mak-
ing a non-transferable term loan to a borrower is far riskier than
underwriting or dealing in the same borrower's tradeable secur-
ity, with the same economic terms but where a liquid market
exists.
This irony - some would say absurdity - of Glass-Steagall
was vividly illustrated by the process by which bank loans to less-
developed countries in the 1980s were gradually converted to
Brady bonds. The loans, on which banks lost billions of dollars,
were eligible, of course, to be held and traded by the banks,
while the bonds, with liquid securities markets and very substan-
tial collateral, were not.
All objective observers would, I think, fully debunk the riski-
ness myth of Glass-Steagall. Yet its residue remains. Even the
proposed legislation 4 to reform Glass-Steagall will not fully re-
peal it. Securities activities will still be required to be conducted
in affiliates separate from the bank, separated by a variety of so-
called "firewalls" whose purpose and effect is to deny the obvious
synergies between such economically similar activities. The net
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377-378 (1988).
4. H.R. 10, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
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result is a material handicap for U.S. institutions in their global
competition with universal banks.
One impediment to getting the law changed, ironically, is
that the combined forces of market pressures, lawyers' ingenuity,
and the regulatory flexibility I mentioned earlier have moved
many U.S. market participants to the point where they feel they
have a large percentage, if certainly not all, of what they need at
the moment, and they are extremely leery of the hazards of the
legislative process. Banks remember well the so-called Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act5 of the early
1990s, which started out as a constructive plan for comprehen-
sive reform but ended up without any expansion of permissible
activities and instead imposed a whole new set of burdensome
requirements. Add to that the reluctance of industry groups,
and the challenge of crafting an acceptable alignment of regula-
tory and supervisory jurisdiction, and the prospects of legislation
during this congressional session are uncertain at best.
To move to my third point, the mismatch between con-
verged financial institutions and national legal and regulatory
structures has a corollary in the mismatch between the way
global financial institutions seek to operate and manage them-
selves, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the way they
are supervised on a piecemeal basis by domestic regulators in the
various countries where they do business.
The basic problem is that global firms, like J.P. Morgan,
manage themselves to the greatest extent possible on a consoli-
dated basis. Absent local restrictions, they would allocate their
capital, book their transactions, manage their risks, and organize
their people in the most efficient way. They would generally pre-
fer to maximize capital efficiency by operating in as many places
as possible off a single capital base, rather than splitting it up
among different legal entities or otherwise. Yet, many countries
do not permit, or else otherwise restrict, branches of foreign in-
stitutions.
Global firms would also generally prefer the cost-saving and
better controls of a single booking center for global transactions,
rather than having to satisfy the informational demands of-°each
country's authorities. Also, we would not be worried about, for
5. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236.
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382 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:377
example, a short market position in one country offset by a long
position in another, or an excess of liabilities in one country off-
set by the opposite in another, so long as the net risk and lever-
age position of the firm as a whole were in prudent balance.
And we would not worry about fully staffing, for example, the
credit, audit, or senior management ranks at every location, so
long as these functions could operate effectively from off-shore.
Now, this is an ideal world from a global financial institu-
tion's point of view, and obviously it runs up against significant
concerns of the local regulators, who feel a responsibility to pro-
tect their own citizens and taxpayers from the failure of a global
institution. Therefore, they naturally seek to "ring fence" the in-
stitution's local activity in a variety of ways.
The result is twofold. First, global institutions are faced with
a plethora of costly, often inconsistent requirements in the mul-
tiple jurisdictions in which they do business. Second, especially
given local secrecy laws that deny information to home country
supervisors, there may be no supervisory body that has a compre-
hensive view of the safety and soundness of the global firm as a
whole, a situation which many cite as giving rise to potential sys-
temic risk in the event of a serious financial problem in that in-
stitution.
These problems have been much discussed by industry par-
ticipants and regulators over the last few years, the most recent
product of which is the Group of Thirty report urging that the
industry itself create a standing committee to develop compre-
hensive standards of risk management and control for global in-
stitutions, against which such firms would be audited by an in-
dependent auditing firm every year, and for compliance with
which regulators would provide various incentives. This ambi-
tious proposal would supplement efforts already underway by
many of the world's financial regulators to share information
and cooperate in the supervision of globally active institutions.
I think all approaches recognize the impracticality of a sin-
gle supranational supervisory body. At best, the hope is that,
with greater harmonization of standards and accounting princi-
ples and more information sharing and cooperation, the host
countries would increasingly defer to the consolidated oversight
of the home country's supervisor with respect to the overall
safety and soundness of the global institution. This is the mutual
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recognition model that is embodied already in the European
Union's banking and investment services directives.
Now, to the extent that national regulatory structures have
been consolidated - which is of course necessary if you're going
to have a single home country supervisor - the direction of reg-
ulatory and supervisory responsibility seems to have been away
from central banks. The United Kingdom is the most recent no-
torious example, with the Bank of England stripped of bank su-
pervisory responsibility which will be lodged, together with se-
curities, investment management, and maybe insurance as well,
under a single Financial Securities Agency. This more closely
approximates the model of countries with universal banking.
There is much debate about the necessary degree of involve-
ment of central banks in the supervision of financial institutions,
but there is no doubt that when financial crises loom, only cen-
tral banks can provide the liquidity - the money - to avert
systemic risk. Therefore, if the objective is greater deference by
host country supervisors to the safety and soundness oversight by
the home country supervisor, it may be that they will be more
reassured to see the agency with the money in that role.
My final observation is that while many steps can be taken to
improve the conditions for effective supervision of global finan-
cial institutions, we should hesitate to put too much faith in the
concept of a single set of global standards. Any body, even a self-
regulatory body, with standard-setting or rule-making authority,
tends toward the seduction of excessively detailed "one size fits
all" prescriptions, which not only raise unrealistic expectations,
but also risk undermining the market discipline and sound dis-
cretionary management that are more critical to the safety and
soundness than any rule book.
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